![]() Almost 60 per cent of deaths in the First World War were a result of artillery and trench mortars 13 by comparison, gas killed few troops. While the initial psychological impact of gas was explicable in terms of surprise and lack of preparedness, its enduring effectiveness as a terror weapon requires explanation. 11 Hulbert thought ‘gas neurosis’ akin to shell shock of a non-concussive type because the severity of symptoms bore no relation to ‘the amount of gas inhaled’ but arose ‘in proportion to the individual’s mental and emotional make-up and instability’. 10 Terms such as ‘gas hysteria’ and ‘gas neurosis’ were coined to describe enduring somatic symptoms once physical lesions had healed. 9 Later in the war Charles Wilson, a regimental medical officer with the Royal Fusiliers, argued that mustard gas had ‘partly usurped the role of high explosive in bringing to a head a natural unfitness for war, or less commonly in undermining fitness sapped by exceptional stress in the field’. Uncontrolled anxiety during a gas attack could cause men to tear off their protective masks, 8 or act ‘as though they had temporarily lost their reason’. He said that, without the gas, we should have had no earthly chance of taking the trenches. In September 1915, when the British released chlorine in retaliation, 6 similar effects were observed of German troops at Loos:Ī German officer in this sector remarked that as soon as the gas entered his trench, he lost all control of his men, a panic ensued and he was unable to keep them in the front line. 4 As these troops had no protective equipment or any training in gas warfare, 5 it was scarcely surprising that they fled when confronted with a suffocating, greenish-yellow cloud. The chaotic retreat of two French divisions, 87th Territorial and 45th Algerian, opened a 4 mile gap in the front line. At Langemarck, on 22 April 1915, the release of 150 tons of chlorine from 6,000 cylinders caused widespread panic. 3 The capacity of gas to inspire fear was apparent from its first large-scale use on the Western Front. Gordon Douglas, a physiologist and specialist gas officer, who concluded that ‘the particular value of the poison is to be found in its remarkable casualty producing power as opposed to its killing power’. ![]() 2 The psychological impact of these toxins was confirmed by Lieutenant Colonel C. ‘I was terrified of gas, to tell you the truth,’ recalled Private John Hall of the Machine Gun Corps, adding, ‘I was more frightened with gas than I was with shell fire.’ 1 Hervey Allen, a US Army infantry officer, recalled the panic often inspired by the threat of chemical weapons and observed, ‘gas shock was as frequent as shell shock’. Borrowing ideas from shell shock, specialist units were set up closer to the front line and medical officers taught to identify crucial points in the course of illness to accelerate recovery times and forestall the accretion of psychosomatic symptoms. By 1917, progressive study of the physical and psychological effects of different types of toxin allowed physicians to design new management strategies. At first, army doctors practised defensive medicine, invaliding their patients for protracted periods to the UK or base hospitals. Soldiers were continually challenged on the battlefield by combinations of different types of agent designed to undermine their confidence in respirators, disorientate them, and erode their morale. The considerable investment in the development of new toxins and methods of delivery was designed to maintain the elements of surprise and uncertainty as these accentuated their psychological effect. Chemical weapons accounted for only 1 per cent of the 750,000 British troops killed in the First World War and yet caused disproportionate casualties (estimated at 180,100).
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